Fingerprint-Based Detection and Diagnosis of Malicious Programs in Hardware

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Abstract—In today’s IC industry, a foundry, an IP provider, a design house, or a CAD vendor may install a hardware Trojan on a chip which executes a malicious program such as providing an information leak back door. In this paper, we propose a fingerprint-based method to detect any malicious program in hardware. We propose a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) which samples runtime signals in a hardware system during the performance of a computation, and generates a cryptographic hash-based fingerprint that uniquely identifies a sequence of sampled signals. A hardware Trojan cannot tamper any sampled signal without leaving tamper evidence such as a missing or incorrect fingerprint. We further verify fingerprints off-chip such that a hardware Trojan cannot tamper the verification process. As a case study, we detect hardware-based code injection attacks in a SPARC V8 architecture LEON2 processor. Based on a lightweight block cipher PRESENT, a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) requires only 4.5% area increase, while to avoid being detected by the TEA, a minimum code injection hardware Trojan with a 1KB ROM needs to increase its area from 2.5% to 36.1% of a LEON2 processor. Such a low cost further enables more advanced tamper diagnosis techniques based on concurrent generation of multiple fingerprints.

Index Terms: Security, integrated circuits, built-in self-test.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AES advanced encryption standard
ASIC application-specific integrated circuits
BIST built-in self-test
CAD computer-aided design
DMR dual-module redundancy
EDC error-detecting code
EDCC error-detecting/correcting code
FPGA field-programmable gate array
FSM finite-state machine
IC integrated circuits
IP intellectual property
LFSR linear feedback shift register
NBTI negative biased temperature instability
PMOS p-type metal-oxide semiconductor
RMT redundant multi-threading
ROM read-only memory
RTL register-transfer level
SRAM static random access memory
SIS structure integrity checking
TEA tamper-evident architecture
XOR exclusive OR

NOTATIONS

\[ M = (m_1, m_2, ..., m_n) \] \hspace{1cm} n-bit message
\[ f(M) \] \hspace{1cm} Rabin fingerprint of \( M \)
\[ \text{concat}(A, B) \] \hspace{1cm} concatenation of \( A \) and \( B \)

I. INTRODUCTION

Hardware is the foundation of any security system providing the root of security and trust. In recent years, there is further a growing trend of migrating security solutions down to the hardware level [37], [38], [44], [62], [63], [65]. However, hardware is not free of security threats. An adversary may extract confidential data, cryptographic key or intellectual properties from a hardware device by testing [2], [72], side channel analysis [26], [34], [33], [39], [70], or reverse engineering. Further, an adversary involved in an IC design and manufacturing process such as a designer, an IP provider, a CAD tool vendor or a foundry may tamper an IC chip by installing a “Trojan horse” component such as a logic bomb that compromises computation integrity or an information leak back door that compromises data confidentiality [23].

Testing [2], [72], side channel analysis [26], [34], [33], [39], [70], and online monitoring [67] techniques have been proposed to detect such hardware Trojans. However, hardware Trojans can be very difficult to detect. First, a hardware Trojan can be very difficult to be activated. For example, a hardware Trojan that is only triggered by an IC aging sensor may not be activated in manufacturing test without destroying the chip. Second, a hardware Trojan may leave little trace to detect. For example, a back door may leak information by a side channel without affecting authentic computation results. Further, hardware Trojans are unknowns. Without knowledge on the attack schemes, it is difficult to defend against all possible attacks. Lastly, a supply chain adversary may gain knowledge of an IC design including any tamper detection scheme implemented on the chip and invalidate it.

We propose to overcome these difficulties and detect any malicious program launched by a hardware Trojan as follows. We leverage the existing online monitor or concurrent checking techniques [18], [45]. Alternative to testing, such techniques do not require to activate a hardware Trojan. They check the internal states of a program besides the final results. There is no need of having knowledge on the possible hardware Trojans. However, the traditional online monitor or concurrent checking techniques target detection of runtime errors caused by the physical world such as due to radiation or aging, while an adversary may tamper the system and avoid being detected by (1) generating correct check bits or (2) invalidating the checking mechanism. We
fix such vulnerabilities as follows. We propose a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) which samples runtime signals in a hardware system during the performance of a computation, and generates a cryptographic hash-based fingerprint which uniquely identifies a sequence of sampled signals. A hardware Trojan cannot tamper any sampled signal that contributes to a cryptographic hash-based fingerprint without leaving tamper evidence such as a missing or incorrect fingerprint. Further, we verify such a fingerprint off-chip, for example, by comparing with a pre-computed one or re-computing the fingerprint by simulation or emulation. A hardware Trojan cannot tamper such an off-chip verification process.

As a case study, we present application of this technique which detects hardware-based code injection attacks in a SPARC V8 architecture LEON2 processor [17]. Our logic synthesis results based on the 45nm Nangate open cell library show that, based on a lightweight block cipher PRESENT, a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) requires only 4.5% layout area increase for a LEON2 processor; while to avoid being detected by the TEA, a minimum code injection hardware Trojan with 1KB ROM needs to increase its area from 2.5% to 36.1% of a LEON2 processor.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give an overview on the hardware security problem and related techniques in Section II, before presenting the proposed fingerprint-based tamper detection technique in Section III. We present our case study on detecting hardware-based code injection attacks in a LEON2 processor in Section IV. We further extend the proposed technique for tamper diagnosis in Section V and conclude in Section VI.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Hardware Data Confidentiality

With physical access to a hardware device, an adversary may apply a number of techniques to extract confidential data and even cryptographic keys. Testing is a powerful tool to break cryptography algorithms [2], [72] and to extract sensitive information, e.g., from memory. Side-channel analysis techniques extract critical information by differential power analysis [33], [39], timing analysis [26], [34], [70], or fault injection [6], [8].

A number of techniques are available to prevent such information leaks. Testing is protected by encoding, lock and key [35], or checking the signature of test vectors to guarantee the test vectors are authentic [21]. Including additional circuitry prevents power analysis attacks (by inducing noise [33] or hiding supply variation [55]), timing analysis attacks (by reducing performance difference or increasing performance uncertainty [34]), and fault injection attacks (by concurrent checking [31], [32]).

B. Hardware Design Integrity

Other than data confidentiality, security-providing hardware further needs to ensure hardware design integrity. Due to lack of security mechanisms, in today’s global IC industry, an IP provider, an IC design house, a CAD company, or a foundry can easily tamper a hardware device, for example, by installing a “Trojan horse” component that corrupts the authentic computation, bypasses security checks, or creates a back door for information leaks [23]. Preventing this from happening is the supply chain risk management problem, which has been identified as a national priority in the recently released Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative [48].

Many of the existing hardware integrity-ensuring techniques are based on ensuring data integrity. For example, a FPGA design can be protected by encrypting and hashing its configuration bit stream [3]. In computer architecture, static code integrity verification protects instructions and data in memory, e.g., by encrypting and hashing in writing, and decrypting and hash matching in reading [14], [37], [38], [62], [63]. Encrypting and hashing register file contents further prevents leak of decrypted instructions and data at system interrupts [37].

The dominant hardware IP protection technique is watermarking [1]. IP watermarking secretly conveys the information on content ownership and IP rights. Compared with steganography, IP watermarking further requires the property of robustness, i.e., being infeasible to remove or make useless without destroying the object at the same time. Hardware IP watermarking techniques can be categorized as static and dynamic ones [1], [11], [24]. In static hardware IP watermarking, the watermark is detected without running the IP. The dominant technique is constraint-based, i.e., to include extra constraints which indicate ownership information in solving an optimization problem [53], such as logic optimization [28], place and route [29]. In dynamic hardware IP watermarking, the watermark can only be detected by running the IP. For example, watermarks can be embedded in logic don’t care conditions [73], a watermarked FSM gives the encrypted ownership information for a given input vector sequence [64], or, exhibits a unique property for the input vector sequence which is the encrypted ownership information [49].

These hardware IP watermarking techniques do not lead to hardware IP tamper-proofing. Compared with watermarking, tamper-proofing further requires the watermarks to be verified effectively in the runtime [51]. Static hardware IP watermarks are difficult to verify, e.g., they require reverse engineering to retrieve logic or physical design properties. Dynamic hardware IP watermarks can only be verified by applying special input vectors. They do not verify system runtime behavior, while a Trojan may only start tamper the authentic logic after it is activated.

C. Related Techniques for Computation Integrity

1) Concurrent Checking: To verify system runtime behavior, a concurrent checking system generates information bits and check bits, for example, in an error-detecting code [18], [45]. The simplest check bits can be parity bits, or, duplicate of the information bits in a dual-module redundancy (DMR) scheme. Checking the consistency between the information bits and the check bits can detect runtime errors such as soft errors or adversary tampers (e.g., triggered by a timer) which cannot be detected by testing.
At architecture level, fault tolerant processor design includes a variety of system-level redundant execution and concurrent checking techniques [45]. Lock-stepping schemes compare internal states (e.g., program control flow [42], [46], [58], hardware control signals [13], memory access [47], and reasonableness of results [43], [59]) in each cycle with duplicated program runs in a watchdog co-processor. Non-lock-stepping schemes such as Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT) compare only outputs of committed instructions [4], [5], [19], [56], [66]. Error-detecting/correcting code (EDCC)-based hardware assertion techniques lead to more hardware-efficient fault tolerant processors compared with lockstepping or RMT [60], [61], [71].

A specific category of concurrent checking techniques are control flow checking techniques which verify dynamic code integrity. In structure integrity checking (SIS), each branch-free code sequence is assigned a random number as its signature, while a watchdog co-processor runs a simplified code, which keeps the control structure, but includes only "receive signature" and "check signature" instructions [42]. In basic path signature analysis, each branch-free code sequence (aka node) has a signature which comes from, e.g., parity, checksum, or linear feedback shift register (LFSR) of the instruction words. The watchdog co-processor computes a signature dynamically at runtime and compares with the signature computed statically at assembly time [46].

In branch address hashing, a branch target address is computed at runtime based on a signature computed at runtime. An incorrect control flow results in an incorrect signature and an incorrect branch target address, such that the subsequent node has an incorrect signature, which will be detected [58].

2) Built-In Self Test: A similar category of techniques are built-in self test (BIST) [10], [16]. A typical BIST scheme includes a pattern generator, a response compactor, and a comparator. BIST leads to significant test cost reduction. However, it may not be effective in detecting adversary tamper. For example, a Trojan may not alter the computation result, or, a Trojan may only be triggered by some input patterns that are not included in the BIST scheme. Nevertheless, we observe that the response compaction techniques in BIST are very efficient in reducing the size of data to verify while monitoring a hardware system over a long period of time.

Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) provide efficient implementation for pseudo-random number generation and response compaction in BIST. A LFSR consists of D flip-flops and linear exclusive-OR (XOR) gates. For pseudo-random number generation, a LFSR of $n$ D flip-flops cycles through $2^n - 1$ finite states. For response compaction, a LFSR takes as input a bit stream of output data from the circuit-under-test. Taking this bit stream as a descending order coefficient polynomial, a LFSR performs polynomial division of this bit stream polynomial by the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR. The final state of a modular LFSR is the remainder of the polynomial division (Fig. 1) [10].

We observe that the response compaction techniques in BIST are fingerprinting techniques. Specifically, modular LFSR-based response compaction produces Rabin fingerprints [54].

3) Fingerprinting: Fingerprints are short tags for larger objects. They have the property that if two fingerprints are different then the corresponding objects are certainly different and there is only a small probability that two different objects have the same fingerprints. The latter event is called a collision. Such a model and requirements are similar to those for universal hashing. However, the emphasis and the relation between the number $n$ of objects and the fingerprint length $k$ are different. For hashing we are interested in bounding the
number of collisions, and typically $n$ is much larger than $2^k$; for fingerprinting we want to avoid collisions altogether, and we must take $n \leq 2^k$ [9]. For a given $n$-bit message $M = (m_1, m_2, ..., m_n)$, we represent it by a polynomial $M(x)$ of degree $n-1$ over finite field $GF(2^n)$,

$$M(x) = m_1x^{n-1} + m_2x^{n-2} + ... + m_n$$

(1)

A Rabin fingerprint $f(M)$ is the remainder after polynomial division of $M(x)$ by an irreducible polynomial $P(x)$.

$$f(M) = M(x) \mod P(x)$$

(2)

Rabin fingerprint can be computed in linear time, and efficiently implemented by a LFSR [9]. However, Rabin’s algorithm is not secure against malicious attacks. An adversary can easily obtain the key (e.g., the seed value in a LFSR) and modify a message without changing its fingerprint. Cryptographic hash functions generally serve as higher quality fingerprint functions. However, they are much more costly, and lack proven guarantees on collision probability.

Fingerprints are widely used for deduplication in communication. For example, before re-loading a large file, a web browser first fetches the fingerprint of the file, compares it to that of an old copy, determines if the large file has any update, and only re-loads the file if an update exists [15].

III. FINGERPRINT-BASED DETECTION OF MALICIOUS PROGRAMS IN HARDWARE

A. Supply Chain Attack Model

A supply chain adversary is an insider who is involved in the design and the manufacturing of a hardware device. His tamper capability is based on his role in the supply chain, specifically, his read and write permission in the design and the manufacturing process of a specific device. An IP provider or a designer for a specific module may have limited access to the design, while a foundry or a chip-level integration designer has access to the whole device design. The general lack of access control in today’s supply chain further facilitates an adversary to gain knowledge of a design and launch attacks. Besides based on his role in the supply chain, a supply chain adversary may gain further knowledge of a design by probing, testing, side-channel analysis, or reverse engineering. As a result, a supply chain adversary may have read and write permission to the whole design of a particular device.

A supply chain adversary may install a hardware Trojan that is triggered at system runtime [12], [25], [68]. A hardware Trojan can be a logic bomb that compromises hardware computation integrity by altering the authentic computation result, or a back door that compromises hardware data confidentiality by leaking out secrets or confidential information [12], [30], [57], [69]. A back door may launch an attack by performing more (e.g., in leaking out information) or less (e.g., in bypassing existing security checks) than expected, while keeping the authentic computation result intact. Since a logic bomb can be detected by online monitoring or concurrent checking, we focus on detecting back doors in this paper.

Specifically, we consider the security threat that a supply chain adversary (a designer, an IP provider, a CAD vendor, or a foundry) may install a hardware Trojan on an IC which provides an information leak back door once activated. Such a hardware Trojan may not be present in the design (for example installed at a foundry or hidden in an IP) such that it cannot be detected by design verification or formal verification. Further, it is very difficult to detect such a hardware Trojan by testing because (1) it is very difficult to activate it (for example, a hardware Trojan may be triggered by an IC aging sensor), and (2) there may be little trace even if the hardware Trojan is activated, for example, the hardware Trojan may leak information through a side channel or by steganography without affecting the authentic computation, without degrading the system performance and without causing any noticeable power consumption increase.

However, such a hardware Trojan needs to have its own computation, for example, monitoring the authentic computation and finding data of interest from the intermediate computation results. Such a Trojan computation may not alter the authentic computation results. However, it may tamper some of the runtime signals of a hardware system during the performance of a computation as long as it utilizes some of the existing hardware resources. A hardware Trojan that does not utilize any existing hardware resource has a larger footprint which makes it easier to be detected.

B. Fingerprint-Based Detection of Malicious Programs in Hardware

Our approach is to monitor the runtime signals of a hardware system during the performance of a computation to detect any Trojan computation and protect the intermediate data during a computation (while before and after a computation data can be protected by encryption). We further compact the runtime signals into a fingerprint and verify the fingerprint off-chip for computation integrity and tamper detection.

The proposed fingerprint-based malicious program detection scheme includes three components as follows.

1) Signal Sampling: We first sample a group of runtime signals in a hardware system. We will generate a fingerprint based on these signals and verify the fingerprint. As a result, any Trojan computation which tampers any of these sampled signals will be detected.

A Trojan computation tampers the inputs and outputs of a module if the module is utilized for Trojan computation. By sampling any of the module input and output signals, we will detect any Trojan computation which utilizes this module. For example, by sampling the input and output signals of an instruction decoder, we will detect any Trojan computation which sends Trojan instructions to this instruction decoder. By sampling the inputs and outputs of an adder, we will detect any Trojan computation which utilizes this adder. By sampling the memory access signals, we will detect any Trojan memory access (given that the authentic computation and memory access patterns are pre-determined, which we will elaborate in Section verification).
2) **Fingerprint Generation:** We generate a fingerprint which uniquely identifies a group of sampled signals.

We observe that the LFSR-based Rabin fingerprinting technique that is commonly applied in BIST for response compaction does not achieve tamper resistance. A supply chain adversary may generate a fingerprint for his tampered design given a Rabin fingerprinting scheme.

The Rabin fingerprint of the concatenation of two messages $A$ and $B$ has the following properties [9]:

$$f(\text{concat}(A, B)) = f(\text{concat}(f(A), B))$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

and

$$f(\text{concat}(A, B)) = A(x) \ast x^l + B(x) \mod P(x) = f(f(A) \ast f(x^l)) + f(B)$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $l$ is the length of $B$. Suppose that an adversary wants to insert a message $T$ between messages $A$ and $B$. Based on (3), it is guaranteed that $f(\text{concat}(A, T, B)) = f(\text{concat}(A, B))$ if $f(\text{concat}(A, T)) = f(A)$. Based on (4), an adversary can achieve the identical fingerprint after inserting a message $T$ if $f(T) = f(A) + f(f(A) \ast f(x^l))$, where $l$ is the length of message $T$. For a short message, there can be $T = f(T)$. For a long message, an adversary can concatenate a short message $T'$ to an inserted message $T$ to correct the fingerprint, e.g., $T' = f(T') = f(\text{concat}(A, T)) + f(f(\text{concat}(A, T)) \ast f(x^l))$, where $l'$ is the length of message $T'$.

Cryptographic hash function-based fingerprinting prevents such attacks. Cryptographic hash functions include dedicated hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1, and block cipher such as AES-based hash functions. Such cryptographic hash functions have preimage resistance or one-wayness, second preimage resistance, and collision resistance. Preimage resistance or one-wayness ensures that a given hash value, an adversary cannot deduce the message. Second preimage resistance ensures that given a message and its hash value, an adversary cannot find a different message that has the same hash value. Collision resistance ensures that an adversary cannot find two different messages of the same hash value [50]. As a result, given a cryptographic hash function-based fingerprinting scheme, a supply chain adversary cannot design a tamper scheme that alters the response without altering the fingerprint.

3) **Fingerprint Verification:** Given an authentic computation which we know, and many possible tampered computations which we do not know, we ensure the integrity and authenticity of a computation by generating a fingerprint based on sampled runtime signals, and verifying the fingerprint by comparing with a pre-computed one or by repeating the same computation in a separate system. For such verification to be successful, we have a few conditions. (1) The authentic computation needs to be pre-determined, i.e., the instruction sequence is pre-determined and the input data is pre-determined. For certain simple programs such as a boot procedure, this is true. For a complex program, we can partition it into simple instruction sequences, each is free of branching, as in control flow checking [42], [46], [58]. (2) Any tampered computation produces a different fingerprint. This can be achieved by choosing a fingerprint generation method of satisfiable collision resistance, and choosing a group of sampled runtime signals which a Trojan computation tampers. (3) The verification cost is acceptable. This is not a problem for any repeated computation such as boot. A complex program can be partitioned into simple instruction sequences and the sampled runtime signals can be selected such that they are expected to be the same for repeated computation, for example, as in control flow checking [42], [46], [58].

We verify a fingerprint off-chip such that a hardware Trojan cannot tamper the verification procedure. For example, to detect any Trojan installed by an ASIC foundry, we compute a fingerprint by RTL simulation or FPGA emulation. To detect any Trojan installed by an IP provider, we compute a fingerprint based on a function model of the IP or another IP of the same function.

A fingerprint may be verified concurrently to the computation under verification, or stored and verified at a later time.

C. **Comparison to Concurrent Checking and BIST**

The proposed fingerprint-based tamper detection method differs with the existing concurrent checking techniques as follows.

1) Tamper resistance. The existing concurrent checking techniques do not achieve tamper resistance. A hardware Trojan may tamper information signals and check signals together, or invalidate any on-chip concurrent checking mechanism to avoid being detected.

2) Tamper evidence. Concurrent checking discards runtime signals instantly. In the proposed technique, a fingerprint may be stored for later verification, and multiple fingerprints may provide tamper diagnosis.

3) Efficiency. Compacting a vast amount of sampled signals into a fingerprint provides efficiency in storage or instant verification. In comparison, concurrent checking either checks each sample signal individually, e.g., in a DMR scheme [18], or, checks a group of sample signals, e.g., based on an error-detecting code (EDC) [40], [41], or, checks the signature of a code snippet in control flow checking [43]. Concurrent checking is performed on the fly, either in lock-stepping which checks internal states or non-lock-stepping which checks only the final output of a program [45]. There are further synchronization and communication bandwidth problems between an on-chip function system and an off-chip checking system in lock-stepping concurrent checking.

Fingerprint-based tamper detection differs with BIST as follows.

1) BIST detects only any output difference for the given input patterns. Fingerprint-based tamper detection covers any sample signal for all input patterns.

2) BIST achieves LFSR-based response compaction or Rabin fingerprinting. Fingerprint-based tamper detection achieves fingerprints of higher quality based on cryptographic hash functions that are resistant to adversary tamper.
the instruction cache. Since the Trojan ROM is very small, it
to fetch instructions from the Trojan ROM other than from
instruction fetch unit. When the trigger condition is met, f or
trigger logic module monitors the program count (a hardware Trojan may tamper the instruction memory and
and capacity for a hardware Trojan. For example, a hardware
[52]. The only difference between this sensor and a regular 6 T
only be triggered after the IC is sufficiently aged. Such an IC
bits of the program count.
checking [13], [42], [43], [46], [47], [58], [59]. However, if a
check, because the Trojan instructions are not in the memory. It
cannot be detected by non-lock-stepping concurrent checking
[4], [5], [19], [56], [66] because the authentic computation re-
sults are intact. It may be detected by lock-stepping concurrent
checking [13], [42], [43], [46], [47], [58], [59]. However, if a
lock-stepping concurrent checking mechanism resides on a different chip, it would be difficult to
achieve synchronization, and only a limited number of signals
can be monitored. As a result, a supply chain adversary may
tamper the system while keeping the sampled signals intact.

B. Tamper-Evident Architecture

Our fingerprint-based tamper detection is based on a tamper-
evident architecture (TEA) that generates fingerprints for sam-
ples signals (Fig. 4). By sampling the instruction fetch unit
inputs, we can detect Trojans that send Trojan signals such as
branch target addresses to the instruction fetch unit. While at
a higher cost, a supply chain adversary may create his own
Trojan instruction fetch unit that inserts Trojan instructions
to the instruction decoder unit. By sampling the instruction
decoder unit inputs, we can detect Trojans that send Trojan
instructions to the decoder unit. While at a higher cost, a
supply chain adversary may create his own Trojan instruction
decoder unit that sends control signals and data to the function
units in the execute stage. To defeat such an attack, we need
to further sample the execute stage inputs. While at an even
higher cost, a supply chain adversary may create his own
Trojan function units. To defeat such an attack, we need to
further sample the register files and the memory inputs.

IV. CASE STUDY

As a case study, we demonstrate application of the proposed
fingerprint-based method to detect hardware-based code injec-
tion attacks in a processor.

A. Code Injection Hardware Trojan

Code injection is a major mechanism in software-based
attacks. Code injection further provides increased efficiency
and capacity for a hardware Trojan. For example, a hardware
Trojan may launch a deputy attack (i.e., use the benign
microprocessor in a malicious way) [20], and tamper data in
memory that is encrypted and authenticated such that only the
authentic microprocessor has access to. It has been shown that
a hardware Trojan may tamper the instruction memory and
direct a processor to execute malicious instructions, e.g., by
inserting a JUMP instruction [27], or tampering a procedure
return address stack through an overflow buffer [36]. Here
we present a hardware Trojan which injects Trojan code from
a Trojan ROM to an authentic instruction decoder.

A code injection Trojan can be very small. For example,
it may only need to include a Trojan ROM containing the
Trojan instructions, a few multiplexers at the instruction fetch
unit inputs, and a trigger logic module (Fig. 2). The Trojan
trigger logic module monitors the program count (pc) in the
instruction fetch unit. When the trigger condition is met, for
example, the lower n bits of the next program count are all
zero’s, the Trojan multiplexers direct the instruction fetch unit
to fetch instructions from the Trojan ROM other than from
the instruction cache. Since the Trojan ROM is very small, it
can be addressed by the lower n bits of the program count.
The Trojan instruction sequence starts by saving the program
count and the other processor internal states, and ends by
restoring the processor internal states including the program
count. When the low n bits of the program count equal to the
address of the last Trojan instruction (that restores the program
count), the Trojan multiplexers direct the instruction fetch unit
to fetch instructions from the instruction cache. This resumes
the authentic operation.

To evade manufacturing test, we further include an IC aging
sensor in the Trojan trigger logic such that the Trojan can
only be triggered after the IC is sufficiently aged. Such an IC
aging sensor can be in the form of a 6T SRAM cell which has
a minimum footprint and consumes no static power (Fig. 3)
[52]. The only difference between this sensor and a regular 6T
SRAM cell is that the PMOS transistor P1 is sized up a little bit. This sensor works in two modes: polling and tracking.
In polling or when the sensor is powered up with the pass
transistors turned off, the PMOS transistors fight to determine
the sensor output. Initially as P1 is stronger, the bitline outputs
logic 1. In tracking or when the sensor is powered on, as
the PMOS transistor P1 is constantly subject to a negative
gate-to-source voltage $V_{gs}$, the Negative Biased Temperature
Instability (NBTI) effect increases the threshold voltage of P1.
After the system is aged to the point that P1 is weaker than
P2, a polling will flip the sensor output and enable Trojan
activation.

Such a Trojan cannot be detected by static code integrity
check, because the Trojan instructions are not in the memory. It
cannot be detected by non-lock-stepping concurrent checking
[4], [5], [19], [56], [66] because the authentic computation re-
sults are intact. It may be detected by lock-stepping concurrent
checking [13], [42], [43], [46], [47], [58], [59]. However, if a
lock-stepping concurrent checking mechanism resides on a different chip, it would be difficult to
achieve synchronization, and only a limited number of signals
can be monitored. As a result, a supply chain adversary may
tamper the system while keeping the sampled signals intact.

Fig. 2. A code injection Trojan including a Trojan ROM, multiplexers, and
toggle logic.

Fig. 3. A SRAM cell-based NBTI sensor.
We implement a round-robin scheduling algorithm to sample the signals for a fingerprint generator based on a hash function that accepts fixed-length messages. We sample any specific signal once in every \( k \) clock cycles, which guarantees to detect any inserted Trojan instruction sequence that takes more than \( k \) clock cycles. A Trojan instruction sequence cannot be too short since it needs to start by saving the processor internal states and end by restoring the processor internal states to keep the authentic computation result intact. We have \( k = 5 \) in our implementation.

We implement a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas hash function for fingerprint generation (Fig. 4), while several other hash functions such as Davies-Meyer and Miyaguchi-Preneel are equally effective [50]. We divide a message \( x \) into blocks \( x_i \) of a fixed size such as 128 bits. A block cipher such as AES encrypts each message block \( x_i \), while taking a mapping \( g(H_{i-1}) \) from the previous output \( H_{i-1} \) as the key input to the cipher. If the previous output \( H_{i-1} \) and the key input have the same length, \( g(.) \) can be the identity mapping. After encryption, we XOR the encrypted message block \( e_{g(H_{i-1})}(x_i) \) to the original message block \( x_i \). The function can be expressed as: \( H_i = e_{g(H_{i-1})}(x_i) \oplus x_i \). The last output value computed is the hash of the whole message \( x_1, x_2, ..., x_n \), i.e., \( H_n = h(x) \) [50].

A particularly strong attack against this tamper-evident architecture (TEA) and fingerprint-based tamper detection method is for a hardware Trojan to initiate a precise interrupt. A precise interrupt does not affect any program output but increases the runtime of an on-the-fly program. Similarly, a hardware Trojan may (1) freeze the on-the-fly authentic computation and fingerprint generation process, for example, by clock gating, (2) save the system internal state, (3) perform the Trojan program, (4) restore the system internal state, and (5) resume the on-the-fly authentic computation and fingerprint generation process. Such an attack (as a precise interrupt) does not tamper the authentic computation result or the fingerprint. However, it leads to significant performance degradation which makes it easy to be detected, e.g., by checking the program runtime in clock cycles.

C. Fingerprint Generation and Verification

We generate cryptographic hash-based fingerprints by RTL simulation assuming the RTL design is tamper-free while a foundry or an IP provider may install a hardware Trojan which is not present in the RTL design. A simple input-free program such as a boot sequence has a unique fingerprint \( s \). The TEA is expected to output the fingerprint \( s \) in a given number \( t \) of clock cycles. At the start of a program, we insert a no-op instruction giving in its operand field a check value \( v = f(s, t) \), where \( f \) is a function that is not on-chip and unknown to any supply chain adversary. At the end of a program run, an off-chip verifier that knows the check function \( f(s, t) \) computes its check value \( v' = f(s', t') \) based on the actual fingerprint \( s' \) and the actual runtime \( t' \), and compares \( v \) and \( v' \). Any interrupt time needs to be deducted from the program runtime. If a hardware Trojan fakes an interrupt, the interrupt occurrence record provides tamper evidence. If a hardware Trojan eavesdrops a set of \( (v, s, t) \) and launches a replay attack, i.e., by giving \( v \) first then \( s \) after \( t \) cycles to cover a Trojan program run of \( t \) cycles, an off-chip verifier can detect this by checking if the program of fingerprint \( s \) has been re-launched.
We partition a more complex program including branching instructions into branch-free instruction sequences as in path signature analysis [46]. We generate a fingerprint $s$ and a check value $v = f(s, t)$ for each branch-free instruction sequence which takes $t$ cycles. To prevent a hardware Trojan from injecting a Trojan branch-free instruction sequence and covering it with a set of $(u, s, t)$ in a replay attack, we link each branch-free instruction sequence to its two successor branch-free instruction sequences as follows. We insert two no-op instructions at the end of a branch-free instruction sequence carrying the check values for the next branching and non-branching instruction sequences, respectively. As a result, the program cannot branch to a Trojan instruction sequence.

D. Evaluation

The proposed TEA provides computation integrity verification and intermediate data protection against hardware Trojans or malicious programs. Any hardware Trojan that performs a Trojan program based on any of the hardware modules which signals are sampled leads to an incorrect fingerprint which can be detected. Alternatively, performing all the Trojan program based on dedicated Trojan hardware leads to increased hardware footprint and makes the Trojan easier to be detected.

We evaluate a few possible code injection hardware Trojans and the proposed fingerprint-based tamper detection scheme based on a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) on a five-stage in-order open source SPARC V8 architecture LEON2 processor [17]. We have designed a minimum code injection hardware Trojan including a few multiplexers, a trigger logic network and a 1KB Trojan ROM. We have also designed two tamper-evident architectures respectively based on the AES block cipher and a lightweight block cipher PRESENT that achieves guaranteed preimage and second preimage resistance [7], [50]. We achieve logic synthesis of these designs by Synopsys Physical Compiler based on the 45nm Nangate open source cell library [22]. Table I compares their hardware cost in terms of area, power consumption, and critical path delay. The LEON2 processor is configured to include a five-cycle multiplier, a 35-cycle divider, a floating-point unit, a memory management unit, a PCI interface, and a network unit with no co-processors. Compared with the LEON2 processor, the minimum code injection hardware Trojan with a 1KB ROM leads to a layout area increase of only 2.5%. In the presence of a TEA, the hardware Trojan cannot utilize any existing hardware resources and needs to have its own instruction fetch unit, instruction decode unit, function units, memory, and write back logic. This leads to a layout area increase of 36.1% for the LEON2 processor, which makes it much easier to detect the hardware Trojan. While an AES-based tamper-evident architecture leads to a 45.1% layout area increase, moving to the lightweight block cipher PRESENT leads to a tamper-evident architecture of less than twice the area of a code injection hardware Trojan with a 1KB ROM, or only 4.5% layout area increase for the LEON2 processor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hardware</th>
<th>Area ($\mu m^2$)</th>
<th>Power (mW)</th>
<th>Delay (ns)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEON2</td>
<td>$4.52 \times 10^4$</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>7.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan w/ 1KB ROM</td>
<td>$1.12 \times 10^5$</td>
<td>$2.22 \times 10^{-4}$</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trojan w/ 1KB ROM &amp; IU</td>
<td>$1.60 \times 10^5$</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-Based TEA</td>
<td>$2.04 \times 10^5$</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT-Based TEA</td>
<td>$2.05 \times 10^5$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Tamper Diagnosis

The proposed fingerprint-based tamper detection method can be extended for tamper diagnosis. For example, we generate multiple fingerprints for different groups of sampled signals concurrently. Our experimental results (Table I) show that this is possible to achieve even under a tight area constraint based on a lightweight block cipher such as PRESENT.

We may generate fingerprints for each pipeline stage in a processor. For more thorough diagnosis, one may arrange the sequential elements to sample in a 2-D array, and generate a fingerprint for each row and each column. A sequential element of a tampered signal would be located by the row and the column of an incorrect fingerprint. A more efficient scheme is to generate fingerprints for selected sampling points in a way that is similar to Hamming code construction. For example, for 4 information bits, 3 check bits are generated by taking XOR for bits 1,3,5, and 7, for bits 2,3,6 and 7, and for bits 4,5,6 and 7. In general, for $n$ information bits, log$(n)$ check bits are needed to construct a single-error-correctable Hamming code. Similarly, we need log$(n)$ fingerprints for $n$ sampled signals to locate a single tampered signal.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a fingerprint-based method to detect malicious programs in hardware. We propose a tamper-evident architecture (TEA) which generates fingerprints that each uniquely identifies a sequence of runtime signals in a hardware system during the performance of a computation. We generate cryptographic hash-based fingerprints such that a hardware Trojan cannot tamper any sampled signal without leaving tamper evidence such as a missing or incorrect fingerprint. We verify fingerprints off-chip such that a hardware Trojan cannot tamper the fingerprint verification process. To avoid being detected by the proposed method, a hardware Trojan cannot utilize any hardware module which signals are sampled. This leads to increased Trojan footprint or degraded system performance, and makes Trojan detection easier. As a case study, we apply this technique to detect hardware-based code injection attacks in a LEON2 processor. Logic synthesis based on the 45nm Nangate open cell library shows that, based on a lightweight block cipher PRESENT, a TEA requires only 4.5% area increase for a LEON2 processor, while to avoid being detected by the TEA, a code injection hardware Trojan with a 1KB ROM needs to increase its area from 2.5% to 36.1% of a LEON2 processor. The small overhead of
fingerprint-based tamper detection further enables concurrent generation of multiple fingerprints for more advanced tamper diagnosis techniques.

REFERENCES


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